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hy do mergers occur in waves? Why do so
many mergers occur despite substantial
empirical evidence that they often fail and lead to
lower profits? Why do share prices rise at the same
time as profits decline? To answer these questions,
the traditional framework for understanding merg-
ers must be abandoned.
Mergers and acquisitions: a new approach
We cannot study mergers one by one – each viewed in
isolation. For instance, merger waves may arise when
suitable targets are relatively scarce, and firms must
rush to be first. Thus, to understand the causes and
consequences of mergers, the alternatives must be
examined.That goes for competition authorities too.
To understand mergers, the alternatives must be
examined
The traditional perspective on mergers is to only
study the effects of single mergers, viewed in isola-
tion. The traditional perspective is useful for under-
standing how mergers influence the prices customers
have to pay, and how the profits in the industry are
affected compared to the situation before the merger.
But many other questions, such as when to expect
international takeovers and when to expect national
firms to merge instead, why we need to control
mergers, and why the competition authorities only
care about the consumers, cannot be answered by
traditional research.
To understand the firms’ incentives to merge, the
analysis must be broadened;individual mergers must
be put into context. There are often alternatives to
any specific deal:other mergers for instance,but also
internal growth.
Not only are there many different alternatives, with
different consequences for the merging parties, but
all the different alternatives also affect the firms out-
side the merger. Externalities may be positive, as
when some firms join to reduce competition in the
market. Externalities may be negative, as when a
new combination of assets makes the merging firms
more competitive. Recall the European Commis-
sion’s worries that a merger between GE and
Honeywell would “bundle” engines and avionics in
packages that other firms couldn’t match.
Mergers are also interdependent. Some are mutually
exclusive, giving rise to takeover battles, as when
Cingular and Vodafone both bid for AT&T Wireless.
Other mergers are complementary:If one buys anoth-
er,the acquisition of a third company by a fourth may
be more profitable, leading to a merger wave.
The firms and their owners fare better if they con-
sider all possible alternatives, and if they take into
account the possible moves and countermoves that
their rivals may take. To delineate the firms’ incen-
tives in such a highly interactive environment, one
cannot focus on any particular merger,or any partic-
ular firm’s situation. The incentives of one firm are
very much influenced by what it believes its rivals
will do. The incentives of the rivals will, in turn,
depend on what they believe their competitors will
do.The situation must be examined as a whole.
The new framework
In recent times, a new framework has emerged to
study these problems. The so-called endogenous
merger theory takes the results from traditional the-
ory as a stepping stone. Equipped with an idea of
how different mergers would affect the profits of the
firms in an industry, the fundamental questions are:
which firms will merge, when will they make their
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For many questions
on mergers a new
approach is neededbids, and how will the parties split the surpluses (if
any) from these transactions? 
Endogenous merger theory is novel also for another
reason. It builds on the theory of coalition forma-
tion, a branch of game theory that has not yet found
many applications in economics.
It is timely to survey the first achievements, even
though the endogenous merger literature is still
young. I will cover a few examples of the results and
explain how they help us understand some of the
empirical puzzles about mergers. The survey also
covers some current public policy issues.
Merger puzzles
Why mergers reduce profits ...
There is ample empirical evidence that mergers and
acquisitions often lead to lower profits for the merg-
ing firms and pre-emption might be part of the
explanation why.
Profits may, for instance, suffer because of cultural
clashes or unfavorable reactions of the employees.
The mystery is why so many transactions are com-
pleted nevertheless.
A well-known explanation is that managers strive
to build corporate empires rather than to maximize
shareholder value. Another theory asserts that the
managers who overestimate their abilities the
most, are also most likely to buy a target firm. But
neither of these explanations squares well with the
evidence that mergers on average increase the
combined value of the merging firms in the stock
market.
When Volvo attempted to acquire the competing
truck manufacturer Scania a few years ago, Volvo’s
chairman declared that their primary motive was to
pre-empt other firms with an interest in Scania.And,
indeed, shortly after the merger was blocked by the
European Commission, Volkswagen bought a large
stake in Scania.
It is reasonable to take the chairman at his word
and assume that Volvo’s acquisition of Scania
would have increased Volvo’s profits compared to
the relevant alternative, which in this case was an
alliance of Volvo’s competitors.We will never know
if this particular merger would have increased or
reduced the profits as compared to the outset. It is
clear though, that when pre-emption is an issue,
managers with a wish to maximize their firms’ prof-
its may rationally merge, despite a reduction in the
profits compared to the status quo. Thus, pre-emp-
tion may be part of the explanation for why some
mergers appear to reduce profits (Fridolfsson and
Stennek (2005a).
… and raise share-prices
Mergers are often anticipated. Perhaps that is
because they are often logical adaptations to
changes in industry-wide market conditions that can
be observed by most analysts with an interest in the
industry. The anticipations reach the business press,
and it is highly likely that they also affect share
prices.
But often there are several different merger candi-
dates and there is uncertainty about the identity of
the acquirer, or the target, or both. The pre-merger
share prices will then reflect the firms’ profits for all
possible events, in proportion to how likely they are
perceived to be.
When being an insider reduces profits less than
being an outsider, the firms may compete to buy
each other. When a merger is announced, the stock
market increases the value of the merging firms.
They won the contest – the risk of becoming an out-
sider is gone.
Do mergers occur in waves because of competition? 
Mergers occur in waves, in the economy as a whole,
but also in individual industries. Merger waves are
among the most well-documented facts about merg-
ers, and they have recently been dubbed one of the
ten unresolved puzzles of finance (Brealy and Myers
2003).
It is a safe bet that waves are partly caused by mar-
ket-wide shocks calling many companies to take the
same action, at the same time, for the same reason.
This tendency may be reinforced by strategic con-
cerns. For instance, when the signal arrives, all the
acquirers must raid quickly, if suitable targets are
scarce (Toxvaerd 2004).
The strategic element may also take the form of pro-
tecting managerial rents. Managers often prefer to
remain independent rather than being acquired.One











of the defensive techniques to avoid being taken
over is to acquire another firm to increase the size of
the own firm.A technological shock that is expected
to make mergers profitable some time in the future
may then trigger a pre-emptive wave of defensive
mergers (Gorton, Kahl and Rosen 2004).
Or are merger waves a form of cooperation?
A merger to reduce competition and increase prices
triggers a competitive response from rivals: they
increase production in response to higher prices.But
as mergers reduce competition in the market, they
also dampen the competitive response to future
mergers and, as a result, each merger becomes more
and more profitable (Nilssen and Sörgard 1998 and
Fauli-Oller 2000).
Merger waves raise the issue of monopolization,
which shifts the focus to the effects of mergers on
consumers.
Limits to monopolization
Mergers may harm consumers
Competing firms always have the option to merge in
order to reduce competition.Consumers will have to
pay higher prices; less will be produced and less will
be consumed. Controlling mergers is vital to pre-
serve competitive markets.
But the market itself may inhibit anti-competitive
mergers
George Stigler pointed out that the market itself
restrains firms striving towards oligopoly and
monopoly (Stigler 1950). As mentioned, reduced
competition and increased prices will lure the rivals
to increase their production and to take market
shares from the merging firms. Anticipating hostile
reactions, many mergers may be scrapped already at
the planning stage.
With less hostile reactions,an anti-competitive merg-
er may be profitable. But remaining outside an anti-
competitive merger is usually even more profitable
than participating. The outsiders benefit from the
price increase, but need not reduce output them-
selves.This phenomenon is called hold-up.
Later research has examined the acquisition process
in more detail.And, indeed, it may be impossible for
firms to construct a deal even if a merger would be
profitable (Kamien and Zang 1990, 1993).
Think of a market with three firms and assume that
one of them attempts to buy both competitors at the
same time. In most markets, a monopolist would
earn more than the combined profits of three firms
competing for customers – the merger is profitable.
To convince the competitors to sell their firms, the
would-be acquirer has to offer the targets a premium
above their current level of profits. Assuming the
acquisition plan to be successful, each target realizes
that it would come to enjoy a duopoly position if
rejecting the offer. Each target will accordingly ask
to be compensated for the loss of a duopoly profit,
and not only for the loss of a triopoly profit.The nec-
essary premium may be too high to allow the acquir-
er a surplus.
The hostile reactions from rivals and the hold-up
problem suggest that most of the horizontal mergers
that do occur have other motives than to reduce
competition. The reason may, for example, be to
reduce production costs. Controlling mergers may
thwart, or at least delay, such gains.
But hold-up is only temporary
Hold-up may only delay anti-competitive mergers
rather than preventing them completely. If a firm
delays an acquisition proposal, it may forego an
opportunity to increase its profits. It hopes for the
chance that a competitor acquires the target,increas-
ing profits even more. But, eventually, if no other
firm acts,one firm or another will bring the matter to
an end. Hold-up looks much like a war of attrition,
and the final result is excessive concentration
(Fridolfsson and Stennek 2005b).
Since hold-up is only a temporary friction, merger
control may play an important part in preserving
competitive markets.To design a control system well,
it must be adapted to the hold-up friction. One issue
concerns remedies.
Two diverging views on remedies 
In the past, anti-competitive mergers were prohibit-
ed.Today,problematic mergers are often cleared,but
subject to the condition that the merging parties
divest some assets to remove competitive concerns.
Different authorities have different views and rules,
however.The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) insists that
merging parties secure the agency’s approval of the
buyers before it clears the merger. Up-front buyers
are required in 85 percent of all cases.According to
FTC’s 1999 Divestiture Report, the use of up-front
buyers cures several problems, e.g. that the divesti-
ture process is accelerated, and that the agency may
assist the buyer in preparing for entry into the mar-
ket, but also that is gives the agency a better oppor-
tunity to evaluate the impact of the divestiture on
competition.
The Department of Justice only requires up-front
buyers in less than 10 percent of all cases.
Demanding up-front buyers may delay the consum-
mation of the merger and it gives the buyer of the
assets unfair negotiating leverage.
Side-effects of insisting on up-front buyers
Insisting on an up-front buyer may also have some
less obvious side-effects,in case the likely buyer is an
existing competitor.The divestiture opens up a chan-
nel for transferring wealth from one or more out-
siders to the insiders.Thereby the insiders can appro-
priate a part of the positive externality from the
merger on the outsider, improving the situation of
the insiders relative to the outsiders. If the divesti-
ture requirements can be predicted in advance, the
hold-up frictions will be reduced (Fridolfsson and
Stennek 2005b).
If the divestiture is sufficient to eliminate the anti-
competitive effects of the merger, the increased
speed in the merger process is an advantage. But,
with limited information,it is difficult for the author-
ities to design a package of assets which is sufficient
to ensure that the whole deal will be pro-competi-
tive. Furthermore, if the package reduces the anti-
competitive effects but does not reverse them com-
pletely, the divestiture requirement may do more
harm than good.
There are two possible solutions. One is to require
the assets to be sold to a new entrant, especially in
case the buyer has to be specified up-front.Another
solution is to make sure that the divestiture is suffi-
cient to offset any anti-competitive effects. If uncer-
tain, it may be better to divest too much rather than
too little.
Any policy advice must depend, however, on what
the political goals are.
Why do competition authorities neglect firms’ 
profits? 
The goal of both US and European merger control is
typically perceived to be to protect the consumers.
The firms’ profits are not considered.
The reason is perhaps a concern for the distribution
of wealth in society, combined with the belief that
company owners are typically wealthier than con-
sumers. It is far from clear, however, that merger
control can influence distribution much.And, in any
case, taxes and transfers are probably more effective
means. Many economists have advocated a shift of
focus to economic efficiency – merger control should
attempt to maximize the sum of the firms’ profits
and the consumers’ surplus.
But maybe the authorities are right after all. Maybe
competition authorities should have a consumer bias
even though the ultimate goal may be overall effi-
ciency. The reason is that firms can be expected to
propose the most profitable mergers among those
that would be accepted by the authorities. By
demanding mergers to also benefit consumers, the
firms are forced to propose mergers that are prof-
itable because of important synergetic gains, rather
than those that are profitable because they reduce
competition. That is better for overall efficiency
(Fridolfsson 2006 and Lyons 2002).
In many countries, the most controversial policy
issues concern international mergers.
International mergers
Domestic mergers may reduce international 
competition 
Firms’ decisions to invest in foreign countries are
partly driven by a wish to reduce trade costs by
locating production close to the market. The higher
the trade barriers, the higher the incentives for firms
to start multinational operations. This is referred to
as tariff-jumping.
The dominant form of foreign direct investment is
mergers and acquisitions. Recent research shows
that high trade barriers may induce domestic rather
than international mergers, in contrast to what the
tariff-jumping argument would suggest (Horn and
Persson 2001).
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International mergers
may be less 
advantageous for
smaller countries
In an international oligopolistic market, the firms’
merger incentives balance their interest to avoid
trade costs and their interest to avoid direct compe-
tition. Think, for simplicity’s sake, about two coun-
tries with two firms each.When trade costs are high,
domestic mergers create two local monopolies.Since
the firms cannot compete effectively in foreign mar-
kets, they also spend very little on trade costs. Each
firm will then make a larger profit than if they had
participated in international mergers. International
mergers would create duopolistic competition unre-
strained by any trade costs, in both countries.
Competition authorities may thus have to scrutinize
domestic mergers more thoroughly than internation-
al mergers. Domestic mergers threaten to hinder
international competition.
International mergers may lead to lower wages
Competition authorities are often criticized when
they intervene against domestic mergers or allow
international takeovers.Common arguments include
that they neglect how employees are affected and
that production may be relocated to larger countries.
For instance, international mergers may weaken the
bargaining power of unionized labor and therefore
lead to lower wages in all countries. Domestic merg-
ers, on the other hand, allow the unions to extract
some of the monopoly surplus from their firms
(Lommerud, Sörgard and Straume 2003).
The authorities don’t care about location, they only
care about consumers … 
Mergers are controlled in the interest of consumers.
Consequently, the European Commission has inter-
vened against a number of domestic mergers in small
Member States.For instance,the Commission prohib-
ited Volvo’s acquisition of Scania, arguing that com-
petition would be reduced in e.g.Sweden and Finland.
These interventions triggered a political debate
about merger control and market definitions.
Smaller countries accused the Commission of mak-
ing it impossible for their companies to merge and
obtain leading global positions.
EU officials responded that companies in smaller
countries can obtain leading positions by merging
with companies from other countries. The Volvo/
Renault and Scania/Volkswagen partnerships,
which followed the prohibition of the Volvo/Scania
merger, clearly showed that there were alternative
ways for these companies to grow.
The critics acknowledge that international mergers
may indeed constitute an alternative. But interna-
tional mergers may be less advantageous for smaller
countries.They may have adverse effects on employ-
ment and the location of both headquarters and pro-
duction.
EU officials concede that EU merger control does
not take into account a possible move of firms
abroad.Mergers are controlled in the interest of con-
sumers.
… but consumers care about location
International firms have an incentive to locate their
production in the larger countries with the larger
markets. They may also serve the smaller markets
from the same production facilities to avoid duplica-
tion of plant-specific fixed costs. The consumers in
smaller markets will then have to pay higher prices
to cover the trade costs incurred when exporting
goods from the larger to the smaller countries (Horn
and Stennek 2006).
In developing and transition economies,internation-
al mergers are also criticized for crowding out
domestic investments.
Crowding out 
Many countries agree to so-called national treat-
ment clauses committing them to treat foreign-
owned firms on equal grounds to domestic firms.
Foreign firms are not even supposed to be discrimi-
nated against in takeover-battles with domestic firms
when governments privatize state-owned operations.
UNCTAD and others have raised the concern that
foreign direct investments may “crowd out” domes-
tic investments and shift profits from domestic to
foreign firms.
The crowding-out effects are partly mitigated when
auctions are used.In that case,the foreign firm has to
pay a price which is higher than any domestic firm’s
valuation of the assets. The domestic firm’s valua-
tion, in turn, corresponds exactly to the decline in
profits resulting from the foreign acquisition
(Norbäck and Persson 2005).Future challenges
The message of endogenous merger theory
Endogenous merger theory has for example ex-
plained that acquisitions reducing profits may be
rational. If the target is otherwise taken over by a
competitor, profits may be reduced even more. The
stock market understands the dilemma and rewards
the merging firms.
The new perspective on mergers has also demon-
strated that domestic firms may merge to pre-empt
international mergers that would increase competi-
tion in the home market. We have learned that sev-
eral mergers may occur at almost the same time if
each merger reduces competition and therefore the
competitive response to other mergers.
Although this survey only covers a sample of papers,
the main message is clear:To understand the causes
and consequences of mergers we need to ask what
the alternatives are.
Should competition authorities take alternative 
mergers into account?
Current merger policy is based on false presumptions.
When the authorities examine mergers they simply
assume that the status quo will continue to prevail if
they block a merger. But the true alternative is often
that some other merger will occur instead.
Should the authorities take the true alternatives
into account? The practical difficulties could be
enormous.
Still, traces of the alternative view do exist. Some
anticompetitive mergers are allowed when the
true alternative is bankruptcy. Efficiency gains
can save a problematic merger,but not if there are
less harmful alternative ways to achieve the same
gains.Also recall that the European Commission,
in the debate following the Volvo/Scania case,
defended its position by pointing at alternative
mergers.
The fact is that we do not know how to design a sys-
tem that takes alternative mergers into account. Not
even in principle. We do not know what the appro-
priate material test should be or what information
would be needed. These are the most important
issues for future research.
Merger control has evolved over the years, often in
response to more formal economic thinking. The
policies have been adapted to take into account ever
more complex economic relations. One example is
the treatment of efficiency gains.Evaluating mergers
against true alternatives could become a natural next
step some time in the future.
Again,to understand the effect of a merger,we need
to ask what the alternatives would be.That goes for
authorities too.
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